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The Community Political Order
PROFESSOR PAUL CRAIG*

It is self-evident that the European Economic Community's political order
has evolved over time. Understanding the nature of this evolution and, the
forces which drove it, is more difficult. This paper attempts to explicate this
development. The analysis is necessarily temporal, with the main staging posts
being the Treaty revisions that have taken place since the inception of the EEC.
The trip through the Treaties is like a geographical tour, with some places well
known and others much less so. Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice are
all featured on the trip, while not forgetting the Single European Act, which
was never graced with the name of a physical place. The shifting institutional
balance between Council, European Council, Commission and European
Parliament provides the cornerstone of the analysis. The evolution of this
institutional balance is examined not only in relation to the changes wrought by
successive Treaty amendment, but also through consideration of developments
outside the letter of the Treaty which have had a marked impact on the
institutional disposition of power. Woven into the study is literature on
integration that seeks to explain the motivation behind integration and cannot
therefore be ignored in an examination of the evolution of the political order.
An understanding of this evolution is essential for any reasoned inquiry into
legitimacy and democracy.
I. FROM THE ROME TREATY TO THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

A. The Rome Treaty: ConceptualFoundationsof the OriginalPolitical
Order
The original Rome Treaty encapsulated a particular institutional balance
between the Council, Commission and Assembly. It was clear that the main
repositories of power were the Council and the Commission., and that the
Assembly was accorded little real power in the original Treaty.

* Professor of English Law, St. John's College, Oxford.
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This distribution of power is readily apparent in relation to the distribution
of legislative competence. The Commission possessed the right of legislative
initiative, which enabled it to function as the "engine room" ofthe Community,
and to set its agenda. This role was enhanced by the fact that the Commission
had the bureaucratic structure to fashion the legislative proposals that were
needed to flesh out the bare bones of the Treaty during the all-important
transitional period. The Council's principal power in the legislative process
was its right to vote on the measures suggested by the Commission. The
Assembly, for its part, was largely excluded from this process, notwithstanding
its indirect democratic credentials. It only had the power to be consulted on
legislation emanating from the Commission, and then only when the Treaty so
specified. In large part ,the legislative process was one in which "the
Commission proposed, and the Council disposed." The balance of power
between the Council and Commission was itself shaped by the detail of Article
145.' This provided that the Commission could alter its original proposal as
long as the Council had not yet acted, but after the Council had acted on a
proposal, unanimity would be required in the Council for any amendment to the
proposal. The general message from the Rome Treaty was clear: the Council
would have to vote approval for Commission legislative initiatives, but the
Commission was free to modify its proposal up to the last minute, while the
Council could not easily amend or tinker with the details.
The centrality accorded to the Commission was further underlined by the
other powers it possessed. These were not readily apparent from the face of
Article 155 itself.2 The Commission was the principal administrative organ
within the Community, and it would be responsible for ensuring that
Community legislation was implemented. This would normally entail close ties
with national bureaucracies, thereby setting the pattern for shared
administration within the Community. The Commission was also accorded
authority of an executive nature, as exemplified by its powers over the budget,
and negotiation with third states, and other international organizations. The
Rome Treaty also gave the Commission an important role in the judicial
process. It was the Commission which prosecuted recalcitrant states before the

1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
U.N.T.S. 11.

2. Id., art. 155.

Mar. 25, 1957, art. 145, 298
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ECJ, and it was the Commission which was the initial judge in significant areas
such as competition policy and state aids.
This institutional balance and disposition of authority can only be properly
understood by seeing it against the intellectual background present in the late
1950s and early 1960s. Neofunctionalism was the early, dominant ideology of
Community integration. 3 It embodied a pluralist theory of international
politics, 4 in the sense that it was not based on the assumption that the state was
a single unified actor, nor did it assume that states were the only players on the
international stage. For neofunctionalists "the actions of a state were the
outcome of a process in which political decisionmakers were influenced by
various pressures," 5 including state level bureaucratic actors, societal interest
groups, and multinational corporations. These groups were expected to forge
links across national boundaries with respective groups in other states. It was
also central to neofunctionalist thought that the Commission itself would be a
decisive force in the integration process, being able to orchestrate, manipulate
and maximize the drive towards Community integration, even when this did not
accord with the wishes of some Member States. The central tenet of
neofunctionalism was the concept of "spillover," which had both a functional
and a political dimension. 6
Functional spillover was an intuitively simple and attractive idea, based as
it was upon the interconnectedness of the economy. Different parts of the
economy do not exist in isolation. If there was integration in one sphere it
would, therefore, create pressure for integration to proceed in other areas.
The removal of formal tariff barriers and quotas with the object of
facilitating the creation of a single market, would in turn generate a need to deal
with non-tariff barriers which could have an equally destructive impact on
cross-border trade. This very same desire to create a single market with a level

3. See generally ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
FORCES 1950-1957 (Stanford University Press 1968) (1958); LEON N. LINDBERG, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS
OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1963); LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, EUROPE'S
WOULD-BE POLITY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 7 (1970) [hereinafter
LINDBERG, EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY]; LEON N. LINDBERG & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1971) [hereinafter LINDBERG & SCHEINGOLD, REGIONAL
INTEGRATION].
4. STEPHEN GEORGE, POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 36 (3rd. ed. 1996).

5. Id.
6.Id.at37.
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playing field between the states would then lead to other matters being decided
at Community level.7
Political spillover was equally important to neofunctionalist ideas on
integration. It involved the "build-up of political pressures in favour of further
integration within the states involved.",8 In areas which had been integrated, the
relevant interest groups would then be expected to concentrate their attention
on the Community level, consonant with the basic idea that "you shoot where
the ducks are" and apply pressure on those who have the regulatory power.
Such groups would also become mindful of the remaining barriers to interstate
trade that were preventing them from reaping the full rewards of the integration,
thereby adding to the political pressure for further union. Other interest groups
in sectors not yet touched by the Community hand would come to perceive the
benefits of integration and add their voice to the call for an expanded
Community involvement. The Commission itself was to be a major player in
this political spillover, since it would foster, encourage, and organise the very
beliefs of the various state players.
The explanatory force of neofunctionalism has been attacked, empirically
and theoretically. This will be considered in due course. It is the link between
neofunctionalist thought and the institutional arrangements enshrined in the
Rome Treaty which is of interest here. To understand this link it is necessary to
take a step back to the very foundations of integration and to Jean Monnet's
vision of Europe.
Monnet's conception of Europe was not surprisingly strongly influenced by
his background and the role played by technocrats trained in the Grands Ecoles
within the French bureaucracy. The structure of the ECSC can only be properly
understood against this background. The centrality accorded to the High
Authority was an expression of the technocratic approach, with action being
initiated by experts. A corporatist style, involving networks of outside producer

7. This might be to prevent states from giving advantages to their own industries, thereby necessitating
Community controls on state aid, public procurement and the like. It might remove yet more indirect barriers
to intra-Community trade, hence the plethora of harmonization measures in areas as diverse as banking, trade
marks and product liability. It might also preclude private actors from resurrecting national barriers to trade
through the instrumentality of market division cartels, hence the need for a Community competition policy.
The same forces might also be expected to produce demands for yet further modes of economic integration.
A single market could, arguably, not truly be said to exist while single currencies persisted, hence the stimulus
for a single currency. The very same interconnectedness between monetary union and other issues of macroeconomic policy might then be expected to give rise to further calls for economic union.
8. GEORGE, supra note 4, at 38.
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and interest groups, was the other legacy of Monnet's experience with planning
authorities in France. 9 This was institutionalized in the ECSC in the form of
the Consultative Committee. Integration was to be based on the combination of
benevolent technocrats and interest-propelled economic groups, which would
build transnational coalitions in support of European policy.' 0 Monnet's
strategy was thus for what has been termed elite-led gradualism," as opposed to
a more dramatic leap towards federalism, favored by those such as Spinelli. It
was hoped that popular consent would follow this lead, but the need to engage
powerful business and labor organizations was accorded a much higher priority
than the "direct involvement of as yet uninformed publics".' 2 The idea of a
Parliamentary Assembly within the ECSC was not part of Monnet's original
vision, although he did accept it at a relatively early point in the negotiations.
The Assembly's powers were nonetheless very limited. The same general
institutional structure was carried over to the foundation of the EEC:
"enlightened administration on behalf of uninformed publics, in cooperation
with affected interests and subject to the approval of national governments, was
therefore the compromise again struck in the Treaties of Rome".' 3 While
Monnet was in favor of a democratic Community, "he saw the emergence of
loyalties to the Community institutions developing as a consequence of elite
of Europe, not as an essential
agreements for the functional organization
'4
prerequisite to that organization.'
Neofunctionalism was to be the vehicle through which the Community
would realize integration, conceived of as technocratic, elite-led gradualism,
combined with corporatist style engagement of affected interests. The
predictions of neofunctionalism fitted neatly with Monnet's perception of the
Community. The idea of spillover reinforced the sense that gradualism was a
meaningful strategy for furthering integration. The neofunctionalist view of the
important players in the integration process meshed with those of Monnet. The
High
of the
on the importance
emphasis
neofunctionalist

9. Kevin Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the "Democratic Deficit" in the European Union, 32 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 149, 155 (1994).
10. Helen Wallace, European Governance in Turbulent Times, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 300 (1993).
11. See William Wallace & J. Smith, Democracy or Technocracy? EuropeanIntegrationand the Problem
of PopularConsent, in THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE 140 (J. Hayward ed., 1995).
12. Id.

13. Id. at 143.
14. MARTIN HOLLAND, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTEGRATION 16 (1993) (emphasis omitted).
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Authority/Commission in enhancing integration fostered the self-image of
technocratic elites at the heart of Europe.
For Monnet and kindred spirits the legitimacy of the Community was to be
secured through its outcomes: peace and prosperity. The ECSC was
established in part to render a third European war impossible. The preamble to
the ECSC Treaty bears striking testimony to this fact. Let us not forget that
while the founders of the EEC Treaty hoped that it would lead to further
political integration, they were also fully mindful of the direct economic
benefits of a common market. Peace and prosperity were then potent benefits
to hold out to peoples who had been through a catastrophic war in the recent
past, and who even in the 1950s were living with the Cold War as an ever
present reminder of the fragility of present gains. Democracy was, by way of
contrast, a secondary consideration in a double sense. First, it was felt that the
best or perhaps only way of securing the desired peace and prosperity was by
technocratic elite-led guidance. Additionally, even when attention was focused
on the "people," the notion of democracy was limited or attenuated. The
essence of the discussion was on the way in which the success of the European
enterprise would lead to a transfer of loyalty to and acceptance of the
Community institutions rather than towards the fundamental issue of whether
democratic controls in the more normal sense of the term should form an
important part of the Community order.
The same sense of legitimacy and democracy can be seen in the work of the
neofunctionalists. Legitimacy was conceived of once again largely in terms of
outcomes, more specifically increased prosperity. This is exemplified by the
work of Lindberg and Scheingold. 5 Economic determinism lay at the heart of
their approach to integration. 16 They explicitly addressed the tension between
the technocratic nature of the Community and its legitimacy, and acknowledged
that without effective democratic control, the legitimacy of the Community
institutions would be imperiled. 17 Their response was telling: legitimacy was
secured because of the very gains which technocracy secured, notwithstanding
the diminution this could entail for the role or powers of elected bodies.
Legitimacy and technocracy could therefore exist in perfect harmony, with the
former drawing its succor and content from the increased prosperity provided
15. See generally LINDBERG, EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY, supra note 3.

16. Id. at 260.
17. Id. at 267.
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by the latter. The role to be accorded to democracy itself was perforce limited,
and strikingly similar to that which we identified in Monnet's vision. The
neofunctionalist focus was directed towards the calculation of the degree of
loyalty which people might display towards the Community, 8 and more
specifically to quantification of the requisite "permissive consensus" which
must exist in order to enable the technocratic elite to get on with their tasks.
The theory explaining the moderation that seemed to
accompany technocratic trends is directly related to the
changing life styles and values that we associated with mass
consumption. The idea is that increasing affluence stoked by
new technology and more aggressive business practices
nurture a more benign environment, sublimating social
cleavage in an increasingly successful quest for material goods
and dissolving political conflict in a consensus of apathy.
Control of the government ... [is] important only when a
change in governments portends significant changes in
policies. In other words, they matter only when the parties
perceive significant deprivations or rewards as the stakes of
the political game. In pluralistic political systems ... social
and political citizenship is assured and most significant groups
can count on a slice of the expanding pie. Indeed, the major
problem becomes one of maximizing wealth-clearly a
question for the experts, the technocrats. 9
B. PoliticalStagnation,InstitutionalDevelopment and the Shifting
InstitutionalBalance
The original compact underpinning the Rome Treaty came under strain
beginning in the mid-1960s. Indeed, the period between 1973 and 1983 has
been described as the "stagnant decade". 20 The 1973 Israeli-Arab war was
followed by the oil crisis, recession, and monetary instability. This had far18. Id., ch. 8.
19. Id. at. 268-69.
20. See, e.g., KEITH MIDDLEMAS, ORCHESTRATING EUROPE:
EUROPEAN UNION 1973-1995, at 73 (1995).

THE INFORMAL POLITICS OF THE
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reaching consequences for the Member States. There was a shift in concern
from full employment to inflation, a relative prioritization of finance over trade,
and the resurgence of protective nationalism. 21 The pervasive mood in the
Community institutions was one of gloom. Social measures, such as directives
on codetermination and worker consultation, were rejected by the Council, and
many other measures were stalled, awaiting a Council decision. It was the
tension between Council and Commission, latent since 1965, which produced
this "condition of immobility. '22 The OPEC oil decision at the end of the
1970s pushed oil prices to over twenty dollars per barrel, precipitating further
recession and national defensiveness. Numerous studies testified to the "Eurosclerosis" which beset the Community during this time, most of which pointed
the finger of blame on the difficulties of securing the passage of legislation
through the Council.23
Institutional developments outside the strict letter of the Treaty reflected
this shift to a more intergovernmental perspective. Such developments in
relation to a constitutional document or Treaty are common. They cannot be
ignored since they have a profound effect on the formal disposition of authority
laid down in the original constituent document. This is especially so in relation
to the early years of the Community. There were a number of such institutional
changes which had a marked effect on the Community's institutional balance,
increasing the power of the Council at the expense of the Commission. If they
had been declared illegal there would have been a constitutional crisis in the
Community, since it was clear that the Member States were unwilling to
contemplate decisionmaking on any other terms.
The Luxembourg Accords were one such development. They were the
prime example of negative intergovemmentalism: they gave the Member States
the power to block measures they disliked when they touched on their vital
interests. Statistics as to the number of occasions on which this power was
actually used are, of course, only part of the story. The threat of the veto
shaped the very policies put forward by the Commission, and shaped also the
negotiations concerning them; decisionmaking took place under the shadow of
the veto.

21. Id.at78.
22. Id. at90.
23. See. e.g.,
Pieter Dankert, IntroductiontoTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
3-18 (Loukas Tsoukalis ed., 1983).
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The Council's intergovernmental orientation also had a more positive side.
The Luxembourg Accords were fine, if the ultimate objective was to veto a
measure, but the Member States also desired more finely tuned tools through
which to exercise influence over legislation. The Council attained this
increased power through a number of institutional developments.
COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, was developed
into a more sophisticated support structure for the Council. It was COREPER,
and the working committees that fed into it, which negotiated the details of
draft legislative proposals emanating from the Commission. The existence of
this bureaucratic support machinery enabled the Council to confer with the
Commission about legislation on more equal terms.
This period also saw the emergence of management and regulatory
committees. Article 155 of the Rome Treaty expressly contemplated the
delegation of power from the Council to the Commission. The assumption was
that Council approval was contained in the initial decision to delegate in a
specific subject matter area, and that the empowering regulation would set the
parameters within which the Commission would then act. The corollary was
that the Commission would then make the detailed implementation rules itself,
which would become law without further Council oversight. It rapidly became
clear that this distribution of authority was unsatisfactory for the Member
States. They wished to have a more institutionalized mechanism through which
their views on the detailed norms could be taken into account. This was in part
because the Member States might well disagree between themselves about such
matters, and in part because they were wary about giving the Commission
power to make implementing norms without input and control from the States.
The management and regulatory comnittees were invented to enable the
Member States to exert real influence on the rules made pursuant to a
delegation of power from Council to Commission. These committees were
introduced initially in the agricultural sphere, but spread rapidly to other areas.
They were staffed by national technocrats, plus the Commission, and Member
State influence was reinforced by the fact that a matter could revert to the
Council if the committee failed to support, or disagreed with, a Commission
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proposal. We see here the birth of Comitology, the study of which has become
much more sophisticated as of late.24
The evolution of what is now known as the European Council was another
important feature of this positive intergovernmentalism. It enabled the leaders
of the Member States to discuss general issues of Community concern outside
the framework of the Council itself. The results of their deliberations were
often "binding", in the sense of laying down the parameters of future
Community action, whether in relation to the size of the Common Agricultural
Policy budget, or the strategy for dealing with a foreign policy crisis. The
Commission might be invited to these deliberations, but often it was not. These
meetings thereby enabled the Member States to control and shape the general
direction of Community policy, free from the constraints of action within the
Council itself.
These institutional developments had a marked impact on neofunctionalist
explanations about integration. In empirical terms, it was argued that
neofunctionalism failed to explain the reality of the Community's actual
development. The Luxembourg Crisis of 1965 saw the powerful re-emergence
of state interests. The de facto unanimity principle contained in the
Luxembourg Accords signaled that Member States were not willing to allow
Community development that might be inconsistent with their own perceived
vital interests. Decisionmaking for many years thereafter was to be conducted
in the shadow of the veto. The Commission had a crisis of self-confidence,
reflected in its change in role from emerging government for the Community to
a more cautious bureaucracy. 2s At the state level, many of the predictions of
political spillover were proving to be equally precarious. Interest group
pressure for greater integration of the kind postulated above was equivocal at
best or at worst simply wanting.26
Neofunctionalism was also challenged in theoretical terms. The fact that
Community integration had not proceeded steadily in the manner predicted by
neofunctionalists led to modifications to the theory which rendered it

24. See EU COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christina Joerges & Ellen Vos eds.,
1999); see also, DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC (Mads Andenas &

Alexander Turk eds., 2000).
25. See Karlheinz Neunreither, Transformation of a Political Role: Reconsidering the Case of the
Commission of the European Communities, 10 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 233, 243-44 (1972).
26. See GEORGE, supra note 4, at 41-43.
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increasingly complex and indeterminate.27 This in turn made it difficult to
conduct any meaningful research, since its theoretical core was insufficiently
clear. 28 The precepts of neofunctionalism were attacked more generally for
failure to accord with general themes within international relations, which
sought to explain why states engaged in international cooperation. Thus
Moravcsik argued that the insistence that integration within the EC should be
viewed as sui generis was "based in large part on the a priori expectation that
Europe would develop in a federal direction, which led neofunctionalists to
stress the uniqueness of its institutional structure, rather than analogies to other
29
forms of interstate co-operation.
II. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

A. The SEA and the Reconfigurationof the Community's Institutional
Balance
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was, as we shall see later,
problematic. However, in many ways, it was the Single European Act 1986
which had a more profound impact on the institutional balance within the
Community. This discussion will focus on the principal institutional
ramifications of this Treaty reform. These should be seen against the backdrop,
discussed above, of increased concern that the Community agenda was not
being fulfilled and that decisionmaking was grinding to a halt under the weight
of intergovermentalist pressures. The amendments introduced by the SEA
were devised at least in part as a response to these problems. Three such
changes were of particular importance.
First, the SEA extended qualified majority voting (QMV) in certain
important areas. The most significant amendment was the introduction of
Article 95,30 which allowed measures relating to the completion of the internal
market to be enacted by QMV. This was especially notable given that the great

27. Andrew Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the European Community:
A Liberal
IntergovernmentalistApproach, 31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 473,476 (1993); see also, e.g., the increasingly
complex formulations contained in LINDBERG & SCHEINGOLD, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, supra note 3.
28. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 476.
29. Id. at 477 (emphasis omitted).
30. Previously art. 100(a).
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majority of the measures devised to complete the internal market were enacted
pursuant to Article 95. The shift to QMV was accompanied by a greater
reluctance on the part of Member States to allow recourse to the Luxembourg
Accords. Qualified majority voting had of course been introduced in certain
areas considerably earlier than the SEA, most significantly after the end of the
transitional period at the inception of the Community. The shift to QMV was
indeed one of the reasons for the crisis that led to the Luxembourg Accords
themselves. They testified to the unwillingness of Member States to be bound
by decisions which they did not assent to. The de facto unanimity principle
enshrined in the Accords served to negate in real terms much of the impact of
the earlier changes in the Council's voting rules.
The introduction of QMV in areas such as Article 95, coupled with a
greater reluctance to allow use of the Luxembourg Accords, had a real impact
on Council decisionmaking. Though efforts would of course be made to ensure
consensus wherever possible within the Council, 3' voting would nonetheless be
conducted on the assumption that states really could be subjected to measures
on which they were outvoted. The advent and use of QMV post-1986 made it
more necessary than ever for the states to pay close attention to the measure on
which they were to vote. This further increased the role played by COREPER
and the working groups which fed into it, since it was COREPER which would
engage in the detailed negotiations on draft measures with the Commission.
The impact of such measures was moreover enhanced by the direct effect
doctrine,32 which allowed individuals to derive rights from Community norms
provided that certain conditions were met. In this sense the Member States
came to realize that the norms enacted pursuant to QMV were "for real" within
their own national legal orders.
The second major change made by the SEA was that the European
Parliament (EP) gained some real power in the legislative process. We have
already seen that the EP was accorded scant power in the legislative process
prior to the SEA; it only had the right to be consulted and only where the Treaty
so provided. While the ECJ did its best to reinforce this right,33 it could not
make consultation other than it was. The early 1980s saw the EP take matters

31. See William Nicoll, Representing the States, in MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND, BUILDING THE EUROPEAN
UNION 190-206 (Andrew Duff et al. eds., 1994).

32. Dankert, supra note 23, at 39-56.
33. See Case 138/79, Roquette Freres v. Council, 7 E.C.R. 3333 (1980).
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into its own hands. Frustrated with its minor role in the Community's affairs,
even after it had been directly elected, it proposed major reform. The catalyst
for these proposals lay in the meetings of the Crocodile Group, which were
developed by the EP itself.34 The Draft European Union Treaty of 1984
proposed wholesale institutional and substantive changes. The most relevant
for present purposes was that legislative authority was to be divided between
the Council and the EP.35 This did not prove acceptable to the Member States
which were the main players framing the SEA.
The SEA did, however, contain the cooperation procedure.3 6 This
procedure was meager when viewed against the EP's aspirations in its Draft
Treaty. The Member States might have thought that it was just a sop to the EP
that would lead to no great alteration in the status quo ante, but that prediction
proved to be wrong. The cooperation procedure represented, in the words of
Westlake, "a major constitutional innovation in the Community system., 37 It
applied to Community legislation made under a number of articles, none more
important than Article 95, used for single market legislation. The Commission
realized that it would have to manage the legislative process more actively to
ensure that legislation was not stalled or delayed. It understood that the EP
constituted a new player in its own right. Legislation would have to be drafted
with one eye on what would be acceptable to the EP and the other on what
would pass muster in the Council. The Member States in the Council now had
to cope with QMV in tandem with the increased role accorded to the EP under
the cooperation procedure. The Council could, to be sure, still prevent the
passage of legislation of which it disapproved, but the control that individual
Member States wielded over the legislative process was nonetheless
diminished. If, as was often the case, the Member States individually and
collectively desired that a measure be enacted, they would have to take account
of amendments suggested by the EP, or risk the measure failing through a
combination of opposition from the EP plus one state in the Council.
The third important change in the Community's institutional balance
resulting from the SEA was the formal legitimation of the committee procedure.
34. See FRANCESCO CAPOTORI ET. AL., THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY, COMMENTARY ON THE DRAFT
ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 11-12 (1986).

35. Draft Treaty on European Union, art. 36 reprintedin CAPOTORI, supranote 34, at 145.
36. Id., art. 252.
37. MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COMMISSION AND THE PARLIAMENT: PARTNERS AND RIVALS IN THE
EUROPEAN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 37 (1994).
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We have already seen the rationale for the invention of management and
regulatory committees. The SEA placed these on a firmer footing by modifying
what was then Article 145, now 202, to make clear that the Council could
impose certain requirements with respect to powers delegated by it to the
Commission. While the passage of the SEA formally legitimated the
committee structure, it also, paradoxically or not, gave rise to greater
substantive concerns over what became known as Comitology. The reasons
resided in the very substance of the SEA itself. The single market program,
coupled with the new approach to harmonization, entailed increased use of the
committee system to devise technical standards, health and safety rules and the
like.38 The EP became concerned with its exclusion from this process,
dominated as it is by national technocrats acting in conjunction with the
Commission.
This period also saw important decisions by the ECJ, which affected the
institutional balance within the Community, more specifically the position of
the EP within that balance. In Les Verts, 9 the ECJ held that the acts of the EP
were amenable to judicial review. Though significant in and of itself, it was all
the more so given that the subject matter of the dispute concerned the manner
of allocating funds for fighting elections. The allegation was that allocations
were biased in favor of those parties already represented in the EP. The ECJ's
decision that this was amenable to review served to emphasize that the
Community was to be open to all shades of political party, and that the
democratic regime was not to be structured by the "ins" to exclude the "outs. '4°
The Chernobyl case 41 saw the ECJ crafting legal doctrine to reinforce the newly
won political prerogatives of the EP. The very fact that the EP had been
accorded legislative power by the SEA in certain areas necessarily led to
boundary disputes concerning the appropriate Treaty article under which
legislation should be enacted. The EP sought to maximize the scope of the
cooperation procedure. In the Chernobyl case, it argued that a regulation
should have been enacted under Article 95, rather than under Article 31 of the
Euratom Treaty, which gave it less input into the legislative process. The issue
before the Court was the status of the EP in any such action for judicial review,

38. See infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
39. Case 294/83, Parti ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
40. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1990).

41. Case C-70/88, Parliament v. Council, 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041.
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since at that time it was not listed among the privileged applicants for the
purpose of judicial review under what was Article 173. The Court found for
the EP. While its judgment has been criticized,42 this critique is largely
unfounded. Courts entrusted with the construction of constitutional documents
or Treaties will often have recourse to background principles when interpreting
the letter of the document. In the instant case, the ECJ acknowledged that the
EP was not a privileged applicant for the purposes of judicial review. It also
acknowledged, contrary to its own earlier opinion,43 that the indirect methods of
protecting the EP's legislative prerogatives were imperfect. It then had regard
for the principle of institutional balance that underpinned the distribution of
power in the Community. The EP's prerogatives were "one of the elements of
the institutional balance created by the Treaties,," the observance of which had
to be ensured by the Court itself. The absence in the Treaties of any provision
allowing the Parliament to seek annulment was a procedural gap, but it could
not "prevail over the fundamental interest in the maintenance and observance of
the institutional balance laid down in the Treaties."' ' The EP could therefore
seek review to protect its own prerogatives, which included its participation in
the legislative process.4 6
B. The SEA and the Reconceptualizationof Integration Theory
The limitations of neofunctionalism were, as seen above, already noted by
the late 1960s. Criticism of the doctrine mounted in the years which followed,
but there was no new theory of integration to replace it. It was almost as if the
Euro-sclerosis which beset the Community in the 1970s cast a shadow over any
novel attempt to theorize about the patterns of integration, with the vagaries of
real life proving too complex and uncertain to fit into any meaningful theory at
all. The failure of neofunctionalism to explain the nature of the Community's
development, the intergovemmental developments outside the strict letter of the
Treaty considered above, and a view as to the forces which shaped the SEA
42. See TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 35-36 (1999).
43. Case 302/87, Parliament v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 5615.
44. Parliamentv. Council, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-2042.
45. Id. at 1-2041.
46. See Joseph Weiler, Prideand Prejudice: Parliamentv. Council, 14 EUR. L. REV. 334, 345 (1989); G.
Bebr, The Standing of the European Parliamentin the Community System of Legal Remedies: A Thorny
JurisprudentialDevelopment, 10 Y.B. EUR. L. 171 (1990); Kiernan Bradley, Sense and Sensibility:
Parliament v. Council Continued, 16 EUR. L. REV. 245, 251-54 (1989).
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itself,47 were the foundations for an alternative theory known as liberal
intergovemmentalism. Andrew Moravcsik has produced the fullest and most
elegant version of this theory.48
Moravcsik's thesis is rooted firmly in the current general tradition of
international relations theory. This theory is itself grounded on certain key
assumptions derived from economics, and more specifically from the literature
on public choice and the logic of collective action. The core of liberal
intergovernmentalism is composed of three essential elements, "the assumption
of rational state behavior, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and
an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation. ' '49 The assumption of
rational state behavior provides a general framework of analysis, within which
the costs and benefits of economic interdependence are the primary
determinants of national preferences. The "relative intensity of national
preferences, the existence of alternative coalitions, and the opportunity for issue
linkages provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of the resolution of
distributional conflicts among governments., 50 Consistent with its economic
underpinnings, liberal intergovernmentalism postulates integration being
determined by demand and supply.
The demand for integration is a function of domestic preference formation,
through which the benefits of policy coordination at the European level are
identified. Groups within society articulate preferences and governments,
which then aggregate and give effect to them.5' In this sense, liberal
intergovernmentalists conceive of the relationship between society and
government as one of principal and agent, in which it is societal principals who
delegate power to government agents.52 The primary objective of governments
is to retain power, and this therefore requires them to secure the support of
societal actors by promising to attain the preferences that they have articulated.
47. See Andrew Moravcsik, Negotiatingthe Single European Act: NationalInterestsand Conventional
Stagecraft in the European Community, 45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991).
48. Moravcsik, supranote 27; ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND
STATE POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT 1-18 (1998)

[hereinafter

MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR

EUROPE]; ANDREW MORAVCSIK, NATIONAL PREFERENCE FORMATION AND INTERSTATE BARGAINING IN THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1955-1986 (1992).
49. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 480; MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supranote 48, at 18-23.

50. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 480-81.
51. There is no assumption that literally all groups within society will be in favor of integration in order to
remove such externalities. To the contrary it is readily accepted that there will be distributional consequences
of policy co-ordination which might disadvantage certain groups and hence generate opposition from them.
52. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 483.
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The benefits to be gained from coordination, and hence the preferences for
some degree of integration, can vary. Liberal theories of interdependence do
however make certain more general empirical assumptions about the reasons
why people might be in favor of international policy coordination. Such
theories are based on economic interdependence, in the sense that "increasing
transborder flows of goods, services, factors or pollutants create 'international
policy externalities' among nations which in turn create incentives for policy
coordination.- 53 International policy externalities arise where the policies of
one government create costs and benefits for politically significant social
groups outside its national jurisdiction. Where the achievement of domestic
governmental goals depends on the policies of its foreign counterparts, national
policies are interdependent and policy externalities arise.
The supply of integration is a function of inter-state bargaining and interstate strategic interaction. For liberal intergovernmentalism the shape of
domestic preferences defines "a 'bargaining space' of potentially viable
54
agreements, each of which generates gains for one or more participants.,
Governments that are bent on collective action must therefore choose one such
agreement, and negotiation is the medium through which such collective choice
is made. Yet negotiations themselves are not cost free, and governments will
weigh the potential gains from collective action against the costs of negotiation
and the diminution in the scope of autonomous action which any such
successful agreement will entail.
Liberal intergovernmentalism also provides an explanation as to why such
integration should be pursued through a supranational institution. Once again it
is economics which provides the foundations for liberal intergovernmentalist
thought in this respect. The primary rationale for the existence of such
supranational institutions is efficiency. Regime theory regards such institutions
as a mechanism for the reduction of transaction costs. Constructing individual
ad hoc bargains between states can be costly and inefficient. This problem is
obviated by the creation of a supranational structure such as the EC, which
provides a stable institutional setting for the resolution of the inter-state
bargains considered above. 55 Moravcsik builds on these foundations in order to
53. Id. at 485; MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 48, at 35.

54. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 497.
55. See R. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1984); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1965) (1962).
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explain the novel features of the Community's institutional structure, such as
the powers possessed by the Commission and the ECJ. He acknowledges that
states have both pooled their sovereignty, through qualified majority voting,
and delegated power to semi-autonomous institutions. The explanation for this
is derived explicitly from public choice theory.
Following public choice analyses of domestic constitutional
choice, intergovernmentalist theory views the decision to
adopt qualified majority voting or delegation to common
institutions as the result of a cost-benefit analysis ofthe stream
of future substantive decisions expected to follow from
alternative institutional designs. For individual Member
States carrying out such a cost-benefit calculation, the decision
to delegate or pool sovereignty signals the willingness of
national governments to accept an increased risk of being
outvoted or overruled on any individual issue in exchange for
more efficient collective decision-making on average ...
Compared to unanimity voting, delegation and pooling of
sovereignty are more efficient, but less controlled forms of
collective decision-making. Of the two delegation involves
greater political risk and more efficient decision-making, while
pooling through qualified majority voting involves less risk,
56
but correspondingly less efficiency.
The essence of the liberal intergovernmental model should not be lost sight
of. The central message is that states are the driving forces behind integration,
and that supranational actors are there largely at their behest with little
57
independent impact on the pace of integration.
This picture of the integration process has been contested empirically and
normatively. It cannot be examined in detail here, but it is important to be
aware of the principal aspects of the critique. The empirical claim that states
are the driving force behind integration has been contested by advocates of new
institutionalism and multi-level governance, and from integration theories that

56. Moravcsik, supra note 27, at 509-10; see also MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 48,

at 67-77.
57. MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 48, at 52-66.
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draw on them. These will be examined in the next section. 58 Suffice it to say
for the present that opponents of liberal intergovernmentalism conceive of the
integration process, especially that which takes place outside major Treaty
revisions, as more complex. It is accepted that states are important in this
process. The picture of integration which emerges from new institutionalist
thinking, and multi-level governance, is nonetheless very different, with a
plethora of actors having an important impact on Community development.
Moreover, it should be recognized that the very identification of national
preferences, so central to state-centric theory, can itself be problematic.5 9
A second aspect of the empirical critique is related to, but distinct from, the
first. We have seen that liberal intergovernmentalist thought came to the fore in
the 1980s, in part as a response to the perceived failings ofneofunctionalism, in
part because of intergovemmentalist developments outside the strict letter of the
Treaty, and in part because of the application of general international relations
theory to the Community. The paradox is nonetheless that it was the passage of
the SEA which served to diffuse power and undermine the assumption that
states were the players in the integration process. The extension of QMV
reduced individual state control over decisionmaking. The increase in the
power of the EP diminished state control over the course of events. It
constituted, when viewed against the premises of intergovemmentalism, a
"loose cannon," in that the way in which it would use its powers might not be
readily predictable. The single market enterprise, which was the substantive
raison d'etre of the SEA, led to increased use of Comitology, with the
correlative bypassing of state democracy as national technocrats negotiated
directly with their Community counterparts. The state-centric view of the
world was further weakened by the pattern of Community administration.
Many important policies, such as agriculture and the structural funds, were
administered jointly between the Commission and national officials. This
pattern of shared administration was to be increasingly supplemented by direct
administration, where the Commission would be accorded power to take
forward policy initiatives, often through the use of private contractors, without
a formal link with national bureaucracies. 60 It should not be forgotten that the
SEA revitalized the Community and the role of the Commission therein. It was
58. See infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text.
59. MIDDLEMAS, supra note 20, at 115-35.
60. See infra Part V.

98

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 10:79

the Commission which was the driving force behind the single market project,
the overall legislative agenda, and the shaping of particular policies.
The premises underlying liberal intergovemmentalism have also been
contested from a normative perspective. The rationale for the EP is problematic
for those of this persuasion. So, too, is the conception of democracy and
61
constitutionalism which does and should pertain within the Community.
The normative challenges to state-centric theories, such as liberal
intergovemmentalism, have come more generally from the development within
politics known as the new institutionalism. 62 The foundations for new
institutionalism were laid by March and Olsen.63 They are critical of what they
characterize as the dominant themes in the politics' literature since the 1950s:
contextualism,
reductionism,
utilitarianism,
instrumentalism,
and
functionalism. 64 Contextualism captures the idea that politics is not to be
differentiated from the remainder of society. While this is to some extent true,
March and Olsen lament the fact that whereas historically political scientists
treated the state as an independent factor, which was important to the ordering
of collective life, most modem political scientists do not do so. Reductionism
is expressive of the modem tendency to assume that political phenomena are
best understood as the aggregate consequences of individual or group behavior,
acting so as to maximize their exogenous preferences. This was by way of
contrast to older modes of thinking which "treated political institutions as
determining, ordering, or modifying individual motives, and as acting
autonomously in terms of institutional interests., 65
For the authors,
utilitarianism is indicative of the related inclination within modem political
science to see action as stemming from calculated self-interest. The pre61. Paul Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 11-16 (Paul Craig & Gr-inne de Btrca eds., 1998).
62. The resurgence of interest in institutionalism can be detected in a number of different disciplines,
including political science, economics, international relations, and sociology. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter
W. Powell, Introductionto THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, 1, 1-4 (Walter W.
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., 1991). This should not, however, lead one to think that all those who go
under the mantle of institutionalism subscribe to the same set ofbeliefs. Rational choice institutionalists may
well have modified some of the premises on which rational choice theory itself is based, but they also still
accept many others. To assume that, for example, rational choice institutionalists are particularly close to
either the normative institutionalism of March and Olsen or historical institutionalism would therefore be

mistaken.
63. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL
BASIS OF POLITICS (1989).

64. See id. at 2-8.
65. Id. at 4.
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eminent "vision of human behaviour is a vision of choice," with life being
characterized as "deliberate decision making., 66 This is contrasted with an
historical tradition in which "political behavior was embedded in an
institutional structure of rules, norms, expectations, and traditions that severely
limited the free play of individual will and calculation., 67 Instrumentalism is
used to capture the idea that current political science has given primacy to
outcomes, expressed in terms of resource allocation. This is at the expense of
the historical tradition which "portrayed political decision making primarily as
a process for developing a sense of purpose, direction, identity, and belonging,"
68
and as "a vehicle for educating citizens and improving cultural values.,
Functionalism for March and Olsen signifies the tendency to regard history as
an efficient mechanism for the attainment of some equilibrium, as exemplified
by the primacy accorded to the idea of optimality. This was contrary to the
earlier approach which placed emphasis on the singular or unique within a
particular historical context.
New institutionalism has been employed specifically within the Community
context. It has generated a number of interesting studies which may differ in
detail, but which share one general feature. Present in the studies is the
tendency to treat integration in less state-centered, monistic terms than liberal
intergovemmentalists, and to emphasize the importance of the supranational
institutions themselves in the pattern of Community development. 69 This
accords with the central thrust of new institutionalist thinking:
Without denying the importance of both the social context of
politics and the motives of individual actors ...institutional
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Armstrong, New Institutionalism and European Union Legal Studies, in

LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 89 (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998); Kenneth A. Armstrong,
Regulatingthe Free Movement of Goods: InstitutionsandInstitutional Change, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS

OF EUROPEAN UNION 165 (Jo Shaw & Gillian Moore eds., 1995); Simon J. Bulmer, The Governance of the
European Union: A New InstitutionalistApproach, 13 J. PUB. POL'Y 351 (1993); Markus Jachtenfuchs,

Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance, 1 EUR. L. J. 115 (1995); Paul Pierson, The Path to
European Integration: A HistoricalInstitutionalistAnalysis, 29 COMP. POL. STUD. 123 (1996); Thomas
Risse-Kappen, Exploring the Nature of the Beast: InternationalRelations Theory and ComparativePolicy
Analysis Meet the European Union, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 53 (1996); Daniel Wincott, Institutional
Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday CritiqueofLiberalIntergovernmentalism,33 J.
COMMON MKT. STUD. 597 (1995); Daniel Wincott, Political Theory, Law, and European Union, in NEW
LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 293 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995).
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analysis posits a more independent role for political
institutions. The state is not only affected by society but also
affects it. . . Political democracy depends not only on
economic and social conditions but also on the design of
political institutions. Bureaucratic agencies, legislative
committees, and appellate courts are arenas for contending
social forces, but they are also collections of standard
operating procedures and structures that define and defend
values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs.70

III. FROM MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM

A. Maastricht: The Shifting InstitutionalBalance
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed by the Member States in
February 1992 and entered into force in November 1993. It was preceded by
two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), one dealing with economic and
monetary union, the other with aspects of political integration. The political7
forces that shaped the TEU were as complex as the resulting Treaty itself
This very complexity served to render conclusions about the TEU contentious.
Commentators differed as to the overall impact of the Treaty on the nature of
the Community project and the institutional balance encapsulated therein.
In structural terms, the major innovation of the TEU was the creation of the
three pillar structure. The Community Treaties constituted the first pillar,
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the second pillar, and Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) the third. The details of decisionmaking under pillars two
and three can be found elsewhere.72 Suffice it to say for the present that the
principal difference was that Member States retained much greater control over
decisionmaking in these areas than under pillar one. Decisions made regarding

70. MARCH & OLSEN, supranote 63, at 17 (internal citations omitted).
71. See MIDDLEMAS, supranote 20, at 156-206; MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE, supra note 48, at
379-471; HUGO YOUNG, THIS BLESSED PLOT: BRITAIN AND EUROPE FROM CHURCHILL TO BLAIR 375-411

(1998).
72. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 3-53 (3rd. ed.
2002).
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CFSP and JHA were more intergovernmental in nature, with the Community
institutions having far less of a role within these areas.
In political terms the second of the IGCs which led to the TEU had its
political origins in Member State concerns over foreign policy and the threat to
national security represented by cross-border crime, illicit drugs, and the like.
The imminent breakup of Yugoslavia, and the link between foreign policy and
security, served to bring defense onto the IGC's agenda. It should be
remembered that the very architectural terminology of the pillar structure was
vigorously contested at the IGC. The majority of the Member States, together
with the Commission and the EP, favored an arboreal metaphor: the new
Treaty would be conceived as the trunk, with the three elements constituting the
branches. Opposition from Britain and France convinced the Luxembourg
Presidency that this would not prove acceptable, and that the temple model
would have to be adopted instead.73
Differing conceptual explanations for the emergence of the three-pillar
structure have been given. Weiler has argued that they can best be explained
through a consociational model.74 In pluralistic societies functional stability is
normally secured by cross-cutting cleavages. This could not, however, explain
stability in those societies characterized by cleavages which reinforced each
other, leading to very divisive conceptions of the public good. Some countries
displayed such reinforcing social cleavage, and yet were stable nonetheless.
Consociational theory sought to explain this through the behavior of a cartel of
elites, which rendered the system both functional and stable. 75
The
consociational model is said to correspond to the international dimension of EU
governance, since we have a transnational polity which is sharply segmented by
its Member States, which does none the less manage to create structures to deal
with problems of common concern. 76
There is another possible view: that the states wished to have some degree
of international cooperation in these areas, but were not ready for the
application of the full supranational machinery which operates in pillar one.
This explanation is also explicitly acknowledged by Weiler.7 7 This view is not,
73. See MIDDLEMAS, supra note 20, at 192.
74. See J.H.H. Weiler et al., European Democracyand its Critique,in THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN
EUROPE 4, 28-31 (Jack Hayward ed., 1995).
75. Id. at 30.
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id. at 30.
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however, dependent upon the existence of sharply segmented cleavages
between the states. There will of course be differences of view on the matters
covered by the second and third pillars, but there is no reason to think that these
differences will necessarily be more severe than those which exist on pillar one
issues. Nor is there any reason to believe that such cleavages should be
reinforcing across different divides, thereby giving society its segmented
quality. It is by no means clear that the differences which exist between states
on pillar two and three issues are reinforcing in this sense. The rationale for
choosing intergovernmental over supranational machinery is, rather, that the
states believed that some form of cooperation would be beneficial for reasons of
the kind articulated by liberal intergovernmentalists. The sensitive nature of the
subject matter, touching closely at the heart of national sovereignty, meant that
states preferred the "default position" of intergovemmentalism, thereby
retaining maximum control in their own hands.
A further important institutional feature of the TEU was the recognition
given to the European Council. We have already seen how the meetings of the
heads of state developed outside the strict letter of the original Treaty. The first
mention of the European Council within a Treaty came in the SEA. The TEU
accorded it greater formality,78 by stating that the European Council, meeting at
least twice a year, should provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its
development, and define its general political guidelines. The paucity of Treaty
references to the European Council should not lead one to doubt its importance.
The reality is that no developments of genuine importance for the Community's
internal structure, or for its external relations, will occur without having passed
through at least one summit meeting. It plays a central role in setting the pace
and shape of Community policy, establishing the parameters within which the
other institutions will then operate. Major changes to the Treaties will result
from the IGCs, which will normally be created as a result of meetings in the
European Council. It will be this body which will decide on the pace of
enlargement. It has produced significant constitutional initiatives which affect
the operation of the Community, such as the Inter-Institutional Agreement on
Subsidiarity and the Declaration on Democracy, Transparency, and
Subsidiarity, which were made at, or on the fringes of, such European Council
78. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Oct. 11, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 145 (1997), art. 4, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int [hereinafter TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION] (original Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992)).
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meetings. The state of the European economy will be regularly discussed at
such summits, and priorities accorded to certain types of action. The meetings
of the heads of state will often be a forum for conflict resolution between the
states. External relations form part of the regular agenda.
The relation between the European Council and other Community
institutions has itself evolved. Summits held by heads of state were originally
viewed with suspicion by bodies such as the Commission, since the meetings
were often held in secret and the Commission was normally excluded. Matters
are very different today. The Commission President is a member of the
European Council, and many of the European Council's initiatives are
themselves the result of Commission initiatives. 79 The President of the
European Parliament has, since 1988, addressed a plenary session of the
European Council. The European Council is, in the words of Westlake, "no
80
longer an unwelcome guest but a valued colleague.,
The TEU also made changes to the institutional balance as it operated
directly within the Community pillar. These changes affected the disposition of
power between the Community institutions, and between the Community and
the Member States. The principal modification in the interinstitutional balance
of power was the creation of the codecision procedure. This increased the role
of the EP in the legislative process, a fact which was underlined by its
application to important areas such as the internal market. 81 The EP's power
over the appointment of the Commission was enhanced, and an Ombudsman
was established. Subsidiarity was included to address the balance of power
between the Community and the Member States.8 2 The word "federal" had
been excised from the draft Treaty, ending up on the cutting room floor; the
TEU nonetheless still spoke of an ever closer union.8 3 Subsidiarity was
therefore intended to be protection for state interests against the exercise of
Community power. This was felt to be all the more important, given that the
sphere of Community competence was expanded by the TEU itself. The EC
gained important new powers over economic and monetary policy, as a
precursor to monetary union. The EC was also accorded new or modified
competence over areas as diverse as culture, public health, Trans-European
79. See MARTIN WESTLAKE, THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION at25-26, (1995).

80. Id.at31.
81. See TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION art. 95.

82. Id.,
art. 5.
83. Id.,
art. 1.
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networks, consumer protection, and development cooperation. In formal legal
terms, subsidiarity was to prove problematic insofar as it was intended to be
some panacea for the protection of state power. It only applied to areas which
were not within the Community's "exclusive competence," and there was no
definition of this elusive phrase.8 4 Moreover, the ECJ signaled that it would not
lightly hold that Community action violated the subsidiarity principle. 85 The
principle has, however, had some impact on the incidence and type of
Community measure adopted.
B. Integration,Multilevel Governance, and the Challenge to Liberal
Intergovernmentalism
Liberal intergovemmentalism was itself but part of a broader state-centric
view, which saw the Community not as a challenge to the nation state, but as a
mechanism for strengthening state sovereignty. Supranational institutions
served the wishes of national executives, enabling them to attain policy goals
that would be beneficial to their countries and that could not be obtained by
independent action. 86 The new institutionalist thinking considered above has
challenged this state-centric view. It has also been challenged post-TEU by
those who viewed the Community more in terms of multilevel governance.
The essence of this theory, as presented by Marks, Hooghe, and Blank, is
that integration is a "polity creating process in which authority and policymaking are shared across multiple levels of government-subnational, national
and supranational., 87 While national governments are major players in this
84. CompareA. G. Toth, A Legal Analysis ofSubsidiarity, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHTTREATY
37, 39 (David O'Keefe & Patrick M. Twomey eds.,1994) with Josephine Steiner, Subsidiarity Under the
Maastricht Treaty, in LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT TREATY, supra,at 49, 49-64.

85. See, e.g., Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council 1996 E.C.R. 1-5755; Case C-233/94, Germanyv.
Parliament & Council 1997 E.C.R. 1-2406.
86. See, e.g., ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE 116 (1992); Alan S.

Milward & V Sorensen, Independence orIntegration?A NationalChoice, in THE FRONTIER OF NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY: HISTORY AND THEORY, 1945-1992, at 1, 18-20 (Alan S. Milward et al. eds., 1993); PAUL
TAYLOR, The European Community and the State: Assumptions, Theories and Propositions,17 REV. OF
INT'L STUD. 109 (1991).
87. Gary Marks et al., European Integrationfrom the 1980s: State-Centricv. Multiple-Level Governance,
34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 341,342 (1996); see also, Thomas Risse-Kappen, supra note 69, at 53; Jonathan
Golub, State Power andInstitutionalInfluence in European Integration: Lessonsfrom the PackagingWaste
Directive, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 313 (1996); James Caporaso, The European Union and Forms of
State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 29, 44-48 (1996); Fritz
Scharpf, Introduction: The ProblemSolving CapacityofMulti-Level Governance,4 J. EuR. PUB. POL'Y 520
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process, they do not have a monopoly of control. Decisionmaking competences
"are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by state
executives. '8 8 Supranational institutions, including the Commission, the EP
and the ECJ, "have independent influence in policy-making that cannot be
derived from their role as agents of state executives."8 9 Collective
decisionmaking at the Community level is perceived as entailing a significant
loss of control for state executives. For advocates of multilevel governance,
political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. National arenas may be
of importance for the formation of state preferences, but the "multi-level model
rejects the view that subnational actors are nested exclusively within them." 90
States may play the decisive role in the Treaty making process, but they do not
control this process in its entirety, since other players such as the Commission
will exert influence.
States do not monopolize links between domestic and
European actors, but are among a variety of actors contesting
decisions that are made at a variety of levels. In this
perspective, complex interrelationships in domestic politics do
not stop at the nation-state, but extend to the European level.
The separation between domestic and international politics,
which lies at the heart of the state-centric model, is rejected by
the multi-level governance model. States are an integral and
powerful part of the EU, but they no longer provide the sole
interface between supranational and subnational arenas, and
they share, rather than monopolize, control over many
activities that take place in their respective territories. 9'
Proponents of multi-level governance argue that when competence has
been transferred to the Community level, there are very real limits to the degree
of individual and collective state control over Community decisions.9 2 They
contest the liberal intergovernmentalist thesis which rationalized the power of
(1997); Gary Marks & Doug McAdam, Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political
Opportunity, in GOVERNANCE INTHE EUROPEAN UNION 95-121 (Gary Marks et al. eds., 1996).
88. Marks et al., supra note 87, at 346.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 346-47.
Seeid. at 350-51.
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the Commission and the ECJ through delegation and agency theory. Instead,
they counter that the ability of the principals, the Member States, to control the
agents is limited by a range of factors. These include the "multiplicity of
principals, the mistrust that exists among them, impediments to coherent
principal action, informational asymmetries between principals and agents and
by the unintended consequences of institutional change., 93 While the Council,
the European Council, and the EP have all circumscribed the Commission's
formal monopoly of legislative initiative, "none can claim that it has reduced
the position of the Commission to that of an agent., 94 Agenda setting is a
"shared and contested competence" among the four Community institutions,
rather than being monopolized by any one actor. Subnational actors, such as
interest groups, will also be of importance in this context. The codecision
procedure has moreover transformed the making of legislation from "a simple
Council-dominated process into a complex balancing act between Council,
Parliament and Commission., 95 The result is that "the Council is locked in a
complex relationship of cooperation and contestation with the other two
institutions., 96 A similar pattern can be perceived in the Community's
committee system. While Comitology procedures have enabled the states to
exert some control over the passage of implementing norms, this is far from
proving that states really exercise a monopoly of control in this area. A more
realistic assessment sees outcomes resulting from the interaction of the
Commission, state technocrats and interest groups. 97 Numerous Community
studies have drawn on multilevel governance and new institutionalism.98
Multilevel governance is not in itself a theory of integration, but important
work on integration is supportive of its underlying assumptions, and draws also
on the tenets of new institutionalism. Stone Sweet, and Sandholtz 99 have
advanced a theory of integration to rival the state-centric view posited by the
93. Id. at 353-54.
94. Id. at 358, 361.

95. Id. at 364.
96. Id. at 365; see also WESTLAKE, supranote 37; Paul Craig, Democracy and Rule-Making Within the
EC: An Empiricaland Normative Assessment, 3 EUR. LAW J. 105, 107-09 (1997).
97. Marks et al., supra note 87, at 367-69; .See also, J.H.H. Weiler et al., European Democracy and its
Critique, in THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE 32-33 (Jack Hayward ed., 1995); Wolf Sauter &
Ellen Vos, HarmonizationUnder Community Law: The Comitology Issue, in LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 69, at 169, 186.

98. See supra notes 69, 87.
99. A. Stone Sweet & W. Sandholtz, EuropeanIntegrationand SupranationalGovernance, 4 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 297 (1997).
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intergovernmentalists. They argue that there is a continuum between pure
intergovernmental politics at one end of the spectrum and supranational politics
at the other. Where pure intergovernmental politics operate, the states are the
central players who will bargain inter se to reach commonly acceptable policies;
the EC has only a "passive relevance" in the sense of enhancing the efficiency
of such interstate bargains. At the supranational end of the spectrum there will
be supranational institutions that are able to constrain the behavior of all actors,
including the Member States, within the relevant areas.
A range of factors may affect the shift along the spectrum. Non-state actors
who transact across borders will often need, or benefit from, supranational
governance in terms of common European rules, standards, and the like. The
absence of such rules will be viewed as detrimental because of the increased
transaction costs thereby entailed. When their governments are reluctant to
move in this direction, the private actors can seek access to supranational
organizations such as the Commission and the ECJ. While governments can
influence the pace of integration, "they do not drive the process or fully control
it,"' and intergovernmental bargaining, when it occurs, "more often than not
is responsive to the interests of a nascent, always developing, transnational
society."' 0' 1 The location of a policy area at a particular point on the spectrum
will then be dependent on the levels of cross-border transactions and the
consequential need for supranational coordination within that area. This pattern
of integration is reinforced through the progressive institutionalization of
changes which have occurred.
Organizations produce and transmit the rules that guide social
interaction. They structure access to policy processes,
defining political power and privileging some parts of society
more than others. As supranational organizations acquire and
wield autonomy, they are able to shape not only specific policy
outcomes but also the rules that channel policy-making
behaviours. As supranational organizations and rules emerge
and solidify, they constitute transnational society by
establishing bases for interaction and access points for
influence. As transnational society endures and expands, the
100. Id. at 306.
101. Id. at 307.
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organizations and rules that structure behaviours become more
deeply rooted as "givens", taken for granted as defining
political life.

10 2

C. From Maastrichtto Amsterdam: The Emergence of the Legitimacy
Discourse
In the period between Maastricht and Amsterdam, the discourse on
legitimacy, as well as democracy, took center stage. 0 3 There had, of course,
been discussion of these issues prior to the TEU, but this discourse became
more central in the Amsterdam IGC. The focus of the debate preceding the
Amsterdam Treaty cannot be appreciated without some understanding of the
eclectic forces which contributed to it.
The legitimacy of the EU was called into question in straightforward
political terms by the difficulties in securing ratification of the TEU within the
Member States. The initial Danish "no vote" sent shock waves through the
Community. It set off "a train of responses, among parliamentary parties,
media, and sections of national public opinion in other nations, which almost
wrecked the entire process."1°4 The Community held its breath for the outcome
of the French referendum, which was positive, but only by the smallest of
margins, 51.05 to 48.95 percent. In the UK, the TEU was debated long and
hard, albeit on an implicit incorrect assumption that the national Parliament
102. Id. at 305.
103. See generally, EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY (Soledad Garcia ed., 1993);
THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION IN EUROPE (J. Hayward ed., 1995); A CITIZENS' EUROPE: IN SEARCH OF A
NEW ORDER (Allan Rosas & Esko Antola eds., 1995); DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE IN THE
UNION OF EUROPE (Richard Bellamy et al. eds., 1995); THE EUROPEAN UNION: How DEMOCRATIC IS IT?
(Svein S. Andersen & Kjell A. Eliassen eds., 1996); CONSTITUTIONALISM IN TRANSFORMATION: EUROPEAN
AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione eds., 1996); CONST1TUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES (Richard Bellamy ed., 1996);
CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (Francis Snyder ed., 1996); EUROPE:
THE IMPOSSIBLE STATUS QUO (Renaud Dehousse ed., 1997); DEIRDRE CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL
DEMOCRACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1997); LAWMAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION, supranote 69; J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999); DEMOCRATIZING
THE EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Catherine Hoskyns & Michael Newman
eds., 2000); BRIGID LAFFAN ET AL., EUROPE'S EXPERIMENTAL UNION: RETHINKING INTEGRATION (2000);
JUDGE G.F. MANCINI, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000); EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION AFTER AMSTERDAM: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY (Karlheinz
Neunreither & Antje Wiener eds., 2000); ROMANO PRODI, EUROPE AS I SEE IT (Allan Cameron, trans., 2000).
104. MIDDLEMAS, supra note 20, at 197.
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could, if it so wished, modify particular terms of the Treaty presented to it. The
fight over the Treaty was not confined to the political sphere, but spilled over
into the judicial arena. 0 5 It was in the legal arena that the constitutionality of
ratification was fought out in Germany. While the Federal Constitutional Court
gave the green light for Germany's ratification, it sent powerful signals as to the
limits of Community legislative and judicial competence.' 06 It would be wrong
to believe that the same forces were at work in these and other states which
experienced difficulties over ratification of the TEU. Differing factors shaped
the debate and were accorded prominence in, for example, France, Germany,
and the UK. This very fact served to enhance the problematic status of the EU
among the peoples of Europe in the post-TEU world.
The political challenge was accompanied by literature which questioned
sharply the legitimacy of the TEU from a more constitutional perspective.
Curtin's well known article 10 7 characterized the settlement reached in the TEU
as giving rise to a Union of "bits and pieces," which placed in danger the very
uniformity of Community law. It raised the specter of constitutional chaos
threatening to undermine the cohesion of a legal system which had been built
up over the preceding years.
There was increased discussion as to the institutional legitimacy of the
Community order, notwithstanding the extra power accorded to the EP through
the codecision procedure. This shaded into a growing body of literature
questioning the allocation of power within the Community, and analyzing the
"democracy deficit" which was said to exist therein. This discourse was given
added force by the increase in the scope of Community competence postMaastricht.
The legitimacy of the EU was also called into question on what were in
effect more traditional rule of law grounds, a principal tenet of which is that
laws should be clear in order to guide conduct. The settlement embodied in the
TEU was many things, but clear it was not. The criteria for the making of
legislation within the Community pillar were complex, and this problem was
exacerbated by the plethora of voting rules in the Council. Decisionmaking
105. See Richard Rawlings, Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and Ratification of the Treaty on
European Union, PUB. LAW 254, 367 (1994).
106. See Case 2 BvR 2134/92 & 2159/2, Brunner v. The European Union Treaty I C.M.L.R. 57 (BVerfGE
1994) (F.R.G.).
107. See Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 30
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 17 (1993).
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under pillars two and three had its own terminology, which could be understood
only by those versed in these arcane matters. The substantive complexity was
matched by the variety of systems for numbering the EU and EC provisions.
The combination of substantive and numerical intricacy was particularly
apparent in the provisions on EMU, which formed the economic cornerstone of
the TEU.
IV. THE AMSTERDAM TREATY: CONSOLIDATION AND CHANGE

A. The Discourse ConcerningLegitimacy, Democracy, and Institutional
BalanceLeading to Amsterdam
It was, in the light of the above, unsurprising that issues of legitimacy,
democracy, and institutional balance should loom large in the IGC discussions
leading to the Amsterdam Treaty. 10 8 The documents stressed the need to
preserve the Community's institutional balance; the retention of the
Commission's right of legislative initiative; the simplification of the legislative
process; and problems flowing from pillars two and three.
The desire to preserve institutional balance within the Community was
apparent throughout the Report of the Reflection Group. 10 9 Institutional reform
must observe "the overall institutional balance, in accordance with the specific
character of the European Union. ' ' 10 Democracy was to be thought of in
relation to all the Community institutions and the institutional balance which
existed between them. The Council argued that "democratic legitimacy must
be the expression of the Union's institutional system as a whole," and not
merely a concept thought of only in relation to the EP."' The Commission
stated that the "Union is underpinned by a complex and novel institutional
balance," which relied "primarily on the interaction and co-operation between

108. See, e.g., GRAINNE DE BORCA, The Questfor Legitimacy in the European Union, 59 MOD. L. REV.
349 (1996); Craig, supra note 96, at 112.
109. See generally Report of the Reflection Group, SN 520/95 December 1995, at vii, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int.
I10. Id., 79.
111. EUROPEAN UNION--COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE TREATY ON

EUROPEAN UNION

16 (1995) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE COUNCIL].
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the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission."'"1 2 For the
Commission, maintenance of the "equilibrium of the institutional triangle" was
3 In this
an essential facet of any discussion of legitimacy in the Community. 11
triangle, the Council represented state interests directly, and the EP interests of
the people. The Commission saw its own legitimacy as guardian of the Treaty
objectives, with accountability being enhanced by the new approval procedure
introduced by the TEU. The preservation of institutional balance was also a
feature of the EP's Report. 14 While the EP believed that it had the strongest
direct democratic credentials, its Report accepted the idea of institutional
balance as a guiding principle for the Community as a whole.
The preservation of the Commission's right of legislative initiative was
integrally related to that of institutional balance. Thus the Reflection Group
stated that "the maintenance of the Commission's monopoly of initiative is a
fundamental aspect of the institutional balance of the Community."" 5 The
Commission was, not surprisingly, of like mind on this. It has always regarded
the retention of this right as its gold standard, and has resisted pressure for
change from the EP. Its Report for the 1996 IGC was in the same vein. 16 The
Council was also opposed to any such diminution of the Commission's power,
in part because it could already initiate legislation, through the use of Article
208,'17 and in part because the principal beneficiary of any change would be the
EP, with a consequential increase in its power vis-a-vis the Council. More
surprisingly, the EP did not press for its own independent right of legislative
initiative on this occasion, as it had done hitherto. It did not appear on its own
"shopping list" for the 1996 IGC. "' The rationale for not pressing this issue
was almost certainly political. It probably felt, correctly, that its chances of

112. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, (SEC
95) 731, 18(1) (1995), availableat http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/eu-doc/commissn/reports.htnl
[hereinafter REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TEU].

113. Id. 39.
114. Resolution of the European Parliament on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a
View to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, 1995,
18, available at http://www.europa.eu.int
[hereinafter Resolution of the European Parliament].
115. Report of the Reflection Group, supra note 107, 109.
116. REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TEU, supra note 112,
23, 39.
117. Previously art. 152.
118. Resolution of the European Parliament, supranote 114, 23.
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success were very slim and that failure on this front might prejudice other gains
which it hoped to obtain from the 1996 IGC.1 9
There was general consensus that reform of the legislative procedures was
essential. The EP wished to have coequal legislative status with the Council,
with the codecision procedure applicable for all major legislation made under
the Community pillar.120 The Commission's Report acknowledged the existing
problems with the range of legislative procedures.' 2' In12a later report, 122 it came
out in favor of an approach akin to that of the EP, with a simplified codecision
procedure being used for all main Community legislation. The assent
procedure would still be used for constitutional matters, such as new entrants,
international agreements, and the like. The Council's Report was, as might be
expected, more equivocal. The complexity of the existing arrangements was
acknowledged, 23 but there was no explicit acceptance that the EP should have
a coequal status in the legislative process.
The Reflection Group,
notwithstanding its intergovernmental orientation, came close to the position
24
favored by the EP. 1

The major reports that preceded the Amsterdam Treaty all raised
institutional and substantive concerns over the operation of pillars two and
three. In institutional terms, they noted that the procedures in these areas were
not functioning well. In substantive terms, there was tension from the very fact
that the EU had become involved in these areas at all. This, in itself, had
partially fuelled the debate about legitimacy within the EU, since these new
responsibilities had classically been the preserve of the nation-state.
B. The Treaty ofAmsterdam: Institutionaland Substantive Change
The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) made less sweeping changes than had the
TEU. The 1996 IGC was consciously directed to consolidation, not significant
steps forward. The sense of consolidation was reinforced by the realization that
the major item on the 1996 agenda, the institutional implications of
119. The EP did press for amendment to what was Art. 138b, now Art. 192, to require the Commission to
respond to requests made by the EP.
120. Resolution of the European Parliament, supranote 114, 29.
121. REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE TEU, supra note 112, 52.
122. Scope of the Co-Decision Procedure, Commission Report under Article 189b(8), SEC(96) 1225/4, July
1996, available at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bulilen/9607/i 1001 .htm.
123. REPORT OF THE COUNCIL, supra note 111, 26.
124. See Report of the Reflection Group, supra note 109, 84, 86.
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enlargement, was not going to be addressed. The Treaty that emerged did
nonetheless contain noteworthy institutional and substantive changes.
The principal institutional change was the blurring of the lines between the
three pillars. We have already seen that the TEU drew a sharp line between
decisionmaking under the Community Pillar and under CFSP and JHA. In
these latter contexts, the decisionmaking remained much more
intergovernmental in nature. The ToA blunted the sharpness of this divide.
This was in part through the incorporation of a large section of pillar threedealing with matters such as visas, asylum, and immigration-into the
Community pillar, albeit with a somewhat more restricted role than normal for
the ECJ. It was also in part because the remainder of pillar three, which now
covered police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCC),"'2 allowed
some greater role for the ECJ and EP than hitherto.
A further institutional change introduced by the ToA related to differential
integration. There were of course instances of differential integration long
before 1996,1 26,but the ToA introduced general enabling provisions. Under
Article 11, the Council could authorize "closer co-operation" between Member
States if stringent conditions were met. Thus, for example, closer cooperation
between certain Member States could not be undertaken if, inter alia, the area
fell within the exclusive competence of the Community; if it affected
Community policies, actions or programs; or if it would lead to discrimination
between nationals of Member States.
There were also changes that affected the institutional balance within the
Community pillar. We have already seen that the reports which led to the IGC
were replete with references to the need to simplify the legislative procedures.
A cursory glance at the EC Treaty after the ToA amendments would seem to
indicate that little had changed in this respect. However, closer inspection of
the ToA revealed that the central change recommended by the EP, the
Commission, and the Reflection Group, to the effect that the codecision
procedure should become the principal legislative procedure within the EC
125. The general aim of the modified Pillar Three was declared to be the creation of an area of freedom,
security, and justice, by developing 'common action' in three areas: police co-operation,judicial co-operation
in criminal matters, and the prevention and combating of racism and xenophobia. Particular targets
mentioned are terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, trafficking in persons, offenses against children,
corruption, and fraud.
126. See generally FILIP TUYTSCHAEVER, DIFFERENTIATION IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW (1999);
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EU: FROM UNIFORMITY TO FLEXIBILITY? (Griinne de B6rca & Joanne
Scott eds., 2000).
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Treaty, had largely been achieved. The codecision procedure was amended and
extended to a wider range of Community policies. This further consolidated
the EP's role in the decisionmaking process. The changes made to the
codecision procedure strengthened the EP's position within that procedure.
There were other changes designed to enhance the legitimacy of the Union,
including, for example, the new provision in Article 255 on access to
documents.
The ToA will be remembered, whether affectionately or not, for the fact
that it renumbered all the Articles of the EC Treaty and the TEU. There were
strong arguments for change. Many of the old Treaty Articles were simply
redundant, and had been so for some considerable period of time. The
amendments introduced by the SEA and the TEU had produced an unwieldy
set of EC Treaty articles, which employed a mixture of numbers, combined
with letters. This complexity was compounded by the fact that the TEU itself
used a different type of numbering (Article A, B, etc). The ToA had, moreover,
moved part of pillar three into pillar one. Room had therefore to be created for
these new Treaty Articles. In addition there were new provisions of the EC
Treaty ,and these could not readily have been accommodated without a
renumbering of the Treaty articles.
There were also some significant substantive changes made by the ToA.
The common provisions of the TEU were amended. Article I TEU now
provided that decisions within the EU were to be taken "as openly as possible,"
and as closely as possible to the citizen. Article 6 TEU was amended to declare
that the Union was founded on respect for human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law. Respect for these principles was made a condition of application
27
for membership of the European Union under Article 49 TEU.1
There were also substantive changes to the Community Treaty. Article 2
EC now included equality between men and women as an object of the
Community. Environmental protection was listed as an independent goal rather
than merely as a side effect of economic growth. The promotion of a high
degree of competitiveness was included as a Community task, and economic
development was to be "sustainable" as well as balanced and harmonious.

127. The principle contained in Art. 6 TEU was reinforced by a new Art. 7. This states that if the Council
finds a "serious and persistent breach" by a Member State of principles set out in Art. 6, the Council may
suspend some of that state's rights under the Treaty, including voting rights, albeit without affecting the
relevant state's obligations.
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Article 13 EC conferred legislative competence on the Community to combat
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
age, or sexual orientation. There was a new title on employment to be found in
Articles 125 through 130. Community power in relation to public health was
enhanced. 128 The interests of consumers now included promoting their right to
information, education, and the ability to organize themselves in order to
safeguard their interests. 129
C. InstitutionalDevelopments Independent ofAmendment to the Treaty
The preceding discussion has shown that formal Treaty amendment only
tells part of the story about the institutional balance of power within the EU.
This is as true for the period running from Amsterdam to Nice as it was for that
between Rome and the SEA. Paying exclusive regard to Treaty revision would
miss three important developments which had an impact, albeit in differing
ways, on the institutional balance of power.
The first concerns the role of the European Council, and the way in which
it interacts with other Community institutions. We have already seen the
importance of the European Council in the discussions of the SEA and the
TEU. The ToA had nothing significantly new to say about it, but its role has
continued to evolve nonetheless. The Presidency's Conclusions have always
constituted the highest-level soft law, shaping the direction and timing of policy
for the Union as a whole. The range of subject matter considered at such
meetings has expanded in the 1990s. This has been matched by increasing
detail and variety in the high-level soft law which emerges from these summits.
Most European Council meetings now have lengthy appendices, which take the
form of declarations, resolutions, reports and the like, on the different topics
discussed.1 30 It might be thought that this lends support to the liberal
intergovernmentalist thesis, with its state-centric view of the integration

128. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997), art. 152,

available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eccons-treatyen.pdf [hereinafter EC TREATY].
129. Id., art 153.
130. See, e.g., Lisbon European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 23-24 March 2000, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm; Santa Maria da Feira European Council: Presidency
Conclusions, 19-20 June 2000, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/counciluoff/conclu/index.htm; Nice
European Council, 7-9 December 2000, availableat http://www.europa.eu.int/counciVoff/conclu/index.htm;
Stockholm European Council:
Presidency Conclusions, 23-24 March 2001, available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/index.htm.
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process. This would be overly simplistic; it is readily apparent that the
evolution of policy will not be the preserve of the European Council alone. To
the contrary, other institutional actors, such as the Commission, and the EP,
will play a role which cannot be relegated to that of mere delegate or agent.
Thus the development in policy concerning the internal market has been the
result of a symbiotic relationship between the Commission, the Internal Market
Council, and the European Council.' 3 ' Ideas initially elaborated in one
institutional setting will be amplified in another, and then returned for further
refinement. Nor is this necessarily a conscious, pre-ordained process. The fact
that one can with hindsight discern the emergence of a new or modified policy
should not lead one to think that this was neatly planned in advance. The
institutional interaction between the European Council, Commission and other
players related as much to the gradual emergence of the policy itself as to its
execution.
The second important development was the proliferation of institutional
forms through the use of agencies. We have already seen that the need to
delegate power was recognized in the original Rome Treaty. We have seen also
that the unwillingness of the Council to hand over a blank check to the
Commission was the principal rationale for the creation of the committee
structure now known as Comitology. More recently the institutional structure
has been developed through the use of agencies. There were two agencies
established in 1975, and eight more since 1994.132 In EC terminology, they are
referred to as "satellite bodies." They possess legal personality; have
management boards on which Member State influence predominates, although
there is some supranational representation; they operate outside the
Commission and Council; and they were, with one exception, each established
pursuant to a regulation made under Article 308.133 Seven of the agencies are
concerned with the collation and dissemination of information, two have de
131. See generally Paul Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES (Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott eds., 2002).
132. European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, European Environment Agency, European Training
Foundation, European Monitoring Centre For Drugs and Drug Addiction, European Agency for the Evaluation
of Medicinal Products, Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, European Agency for Safety and
Health at Work, Community Plant Variety Office and European Translation Centre for Bodies of the EU. The
first two agencies mentioned were established in 1975.
133. Alexander, Kreher, Agencies in the European Community-A Step Towards AdministrativeIntegration
in Europe, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y. 227 (1997).
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facto executive/regulatory powers in relation to Community trademarks and
plant variety rights, and one has quasi-executive capacity in relation to
medicines. 134 In formal terms, the degree of agency autonomy is constrained by
ECJ jurisprudence which limits the delegation of power to bodies are not
mentioned in the constituent Treaties.1 35 In substantive terms, the degree of
autonomy possessed by each agency varies considerably, depending upon the
composition of its governing board, its financing and the subject matter with
136
which it deals.
There are differing views as to the rationale for the use of the agency
structure. Kreher contends that agency creation fosters administrative
integration. 137 Dehousse 138 argues that agency creation is a response to
conflicting pressures at work within the Community. There is a sense that
legislative harmonization is insufficient to dismantle barriers to trade, and that
some greater convergence of administrative practice is required. There is also
the growing recognition that further delegation of direct administrative
responsibility to the Commission may be problematic. Regulation by networks,
whereby national and Community administrators come together to try and
achieve a uniform response, is said to be the way out of this conundrum. The
Comitology process is itself the prime example of this form of networking.
Many of these committees have developed from bodies whose prime function is
to oversee the Commission in the discharge of power delegated to it by the
Council, into forums through which national administrators can meet to attempt
to find a uniform strategy for implementation. The ad hoc nature of these
committee meetings is, however, a drawback, and Dehousse therefore sees
agencies as a more permanent institutionalized locus through which such
networking designed to reach the requisite uniformity can take place. 3 9
Shapiro's view is less prosaic. 140 If direct routes to further political integration
134. The bodies with some de facto executive power are the Office for Harmonization and the Community
Plant Variety Office. The EMEA has some quasi-executive capacity.
135. Koen Lenaerts, Regulating the Regulatory Process: "Delegation of Powers" in the European
Community, 18 EUR. L. REV. 23 (1993); Michelle Everson, Independent Agencies: HierarchyBeaters?, I
EUR. L. J. 180 (1995).
136. See Kreher, supranote 133, at 238.
137. Id. at 239-40.
138. Renaud, Dehousse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European
Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y. 246 (1997).
139. Id. at 254-55.
140. Martin, Shapiro, The ProblemsofIndependent Agencies in the United States and the European Union,
4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y. 276, 281 (1997).
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are presently unacceptable, then it is best to proceed via the creation of small
discrete technical units which have the added advantage of not being the
Commission, and not being in Brussels. The creation of relatively small
agencies, each with a particular remit, is, Shapiro feels, also more likely to lead
to the creation of "Europe-wide epistemic communities" of technocrats "whose
technical truths transcend intergovernmental politics.'

14 1

The third significant institutional development was the crisis leading to the
resignation of the Commission. 142 A real appreciation of the events which led
to the resignation of the Santer Commission requires a grasp of the way in
which the Commission functions. It necessitates in particular an understanding
of the distinction between direct and shared administration, and the respective
difficulties with each of these modes of delivering policy. Suffice it to say for
the present that there had been concern about fraud and mismanagement. This
came to light from newspaper reports and investigations by the Court of
Auditors. The European Parliament repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction
with the management of the Community's financial resources. This culminated
in a resolution on January 14, 1999 which called for a Committee of
Independent Experts to be convened under the auspices of the EP and the
Commission, with a mandate to detect and deal with fraud, mismanagement,
and nepotism. The Committee was also to conduct a fundamental review of the
Commission's practices in the award of all financial contracts. The Committee
produced its first report within two months, by March 15, 1999. 14 This had an
immediate and dramatic effect: the Commission resigned en bloc. The
resulting crisis was the dominant headline in newspapers across Europe. The
Second Report of the Committee of Independent Experts 144 received far less
attention and passed almost unnoticed by the press. The two reports set in train
discussion which led to the White Paper on Reform of the Commission. 145 It is
141. Id. at 282.
142. Paul Craig, The Falland Renewal of the Commission: Accountability, Contractand Administrative
Organization, 6 EuR. L. J. 98 (2000).
143. COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, FIRST REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS REGARDING FRAUD,
MISMANAGEMENT AND NEPOTISM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
1.4.2 (Mar. 15, 1999), available at

http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/pdf/reporten.pdf.
144. COMMITTEE OF INDEPENDENT EXPERTS, SECOND REPORT ON REFORM OF THE COMMISSION,
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROPOSALS FOR TACKLING MISMANAGEMENT, IRREGULARITIES AND

FRAUD (Sept. 10 1999), available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/default_en.htm.
145. Reforming the Commission: White Paper from the Commission of the European Communities,
COM(2000)200
final,
available
com2000_O200enO 1-0 .pdf.

at

http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/wpr/2000/act2OOenO
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important to recognize that the IGC discourse that led to the Nice Treaty about
institutional reform pending enlargement was conducted against the
background of discussion about internal Commission reform.
V. THE NICE TREATY: INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND ENLARGEMENT

The IGC which led to the Nice Treaty was almost entirely preoccupied with
the issue which had been ducked in Amsterdam: the institutional consequences
of enlargement. It therefore provided an especially interesting focus for the
dynamics of institutional balance within the Community. Previous Treaty
negotiations focused on the relative and respective powers of Council,
Commission, and EP. In contrast the main focus of the discussions leading to
the Nice Treaty was on intra rather than interinstitutional balance. The debates
saw divisions drawn between large, medium, and small states about the
institutional consequences of enlargement within the Commission, Council, and
the EP. It is true that differences between states as to the disposition of power
within the main Community institutions had affected earlier Treaty revisions,
but in the IGC leading to the Nice Treaty, this was the primary focal point of
the negotiations.
For seasoned IGC watchers, these negotiations provided a powerful
reminder that the devil is in the details. Abstract generalizations about the
powers of the respective institutions do not take one far. Treaty renegotiation is
necessarily and inevitably about the fine-tuning of the institutions' powers. The
Member States and other major players fought long and hard over issues which
might seem to the outsider matters of arcane detail. This is precisely because
the detail is itself reflective of broader issues of principle. It is the detail that
encapsulates the principles shaping the reality of intra and interinstitutional
power in the Community. The disposition of this power cannot readily be
understood without some idea of the key debating points relevant to each
institution. It is only then that one is in a position to make any assessment as to
the institutional balance of the Community as a whole.
Institutional reform of the Council occupied more of the IGC's time than
any other topic. The negotiation centered on the extension of qualified majority
voting and the weighting of votes. All acknowledged that there had to be an
extension of qualified majority voting in an expanded Union. Unanimity would
often be synonymous with inaction, since one state out of twenty-seven would
almost certainly object. Forging agreement on the areas where there should be
a shift to qualified majority proved more difficult. Discussions in the IGC were
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akin to a series of individual skirmishes as to whether another bastion of
unanimity should be given up. A fact rarely acknowledged was that the veto
was always a double-edged sword: it could protect state autonomy, but it could
equally prevent Union action. Much then depended on whether states felt that
they would more often be "vetoed against" than "exercisers of veto power"
themselves.
The options canvassed as to weighting of votes approached the byzantine in
terms of complexity. The reasons are not hard to find. The issue cast into
sharp relief the relative power of large, medium, and small states in the
Council. Discussion focused on a dual majority system, the central element of
which was the fixing of a threshold in terms of majority of the population
coupled with majority of the states, or a simple reweighting model, albeit one
which took some account of population and the number of Member States.'4 6
The later stages of the IGC concentrated on three variants of the latter model:
weak, moderated, and substantial moderating. Weak reweighting coupled with
a population safety net to ensure that any qualified majority would comprise at
least fifty-eight percent of the Union's population. Moderated reweighting
meant that a qualified majority would comprise a percentage of the Union's
population close to the present percentage. Substantial reweighting was
premised on the assumption that a qualified majority would cover over sixty
percent of the population. The Member States with larger populations favored
substantial reweighting. They were concerned that the accession of new, small
states would otherwise weaken the relative weight of the larger states, and the
population they represent, in the Council. Member States with smaller
populations supported weak or moderate reweighting and argued that this
sufficiently protected the position of the larger states.
The solution embodied in the Nice Treaty was in reality midway between
moderate and substantial reweighting. It is found in the Protocol on
Enlargement of the Union, coupled with Declaration 20 on Enlargement, and is
posited on a Union with twenty-seven states. The Protocol comes into effect on
January 1, 2005. The votes accorded to each of the states have been
"stretched" to accommodate the new, smaller states. The largest states have
twenty-nine votes each, the smallest three, with gradations in between. The
146. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, PresidencyNote: IGC
2000-Weighting of Votes, CONFER 4754/00 (May 24, 2000); Working Document, IGC 2000: Weighting
of Votes in the Council, CONFER 4796/00, (Nov. 9 2000).
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votes accorded to the largest states are greater than those proposed for moderate
reweighting, but less than in the substantial reweigthing model. Prior to
enlargement a qualified majority will be 169 out of 237 in cases where the
Council acts on a proposal from the Commission. Where it does not do so,
there is the additional requirement that the votes must be cast by at least twothirds of the states. After enlargement a qualified majority will be 258 out of
345. The other rules are the same. The wishes of the larger states have been
further reinforced by the addition of Article 205(4), which allows a member of
the Council to request verification that the states constituting the qualified
majority represent at least sixty-two percent of the population. If this condition
is not met, the relevant decision cannot be adopted.
The discussion of the EP focused principally on its size and the distribution
of seats in an enlarged Community. The IGC rapidly came to the conclusion
47
that a meaningful upper limit on the number of seats had to be maintained.1
48
To do otherwise would be to expand beyond the limit of 700 set in the ToA1
to a total of 963 in an enlarged Community. The focus then shifted to the
method for deciding on the allocation of seats. One option was for there to be
an across-the-board linear reduction in the number of seats for each Member
State. The existing criterion for allocation would be retained, and there would
be a maximum of 700 MEPs for the Community as a whole. This was opposed
by the larger states, which would, in relative terms, be underrepresented. The
other option, favored by the EP itself,149 was for seat allocation to be
proportionate to population, subject to the caveat that there would be a
minimum number of MEPs from each Member State. Neither of these options
was likely to achieve consensus in its own right, 50 and a compromise was built
into the Nice Treaty, based on greater proportionality in seat allocation than
147. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Presidency Note: IGC
2000-Other Amendments to Be Made to the Treaties with Regard to the European Institutions, CONFER
4740/00, (May 10 2000), available at http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04740en.pdf.
148. ECTREATY art. 189.
149. Report on the European Parliament's Proposals for the Intergovernmental Conference, Part 1: Motion
for a resolution, EUR. PARL. Doc. (A5-0086/2000 final edition) (Mar. 27, 2000).
150. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Presidency Note: IGC
2000-Le Parlement Europten, CONFER 4771/00, availableat http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/
geninfo/confer4771lfr.pdf; Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
Presidency Report to the Feira European Council, CONFER 4750/00, 33-6 (2000), available at
http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04750en.pdf; Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of
the Member States, Presidency Note: IGC 2000-Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament, CONFER
4805/00 (2000), availableat http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/4805en.pdf.
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hitherto, though still less than advocated by the EP. Article 189 was modified
to set the upper limit of MEPs at 732. The allocation of seats was set out in a
Protocol attached to the Nice Treaty, and comes into effect on January 1,
2004. t1 t Declaration 20, attached to the Nice Treaty, lays down the allocation
of seats in an EU with twenty-seven Member States.
The institutional implications of enlargement for the Commission raised a
number of important issues. Much consideration was given to the size of the
Commission. Opinion in the IGC was divided as to whether there should
continue to be one Commissioner from each state, or whether there should be
an upper limit combined with a system of rotation. 5 2 The argument for the
latter view was in part conceptual, in the sense that Commissioners do not in
any event represent their state. It was also in part practical, in that the operation
of a Commission with twenty-seven or twenty-eight Commissioners was felt to
cross the line between a collegiate body and a deliberative assembly. The Nice
Treaty embodied a compromise in this respect. The Protocol on Enlargement
provided that from January 1, 2005, Article 213(1) should be amended to
provide that the Commission consist of one national from each state. When the
Union has twenty-seven Member States, Article 213(1) will be further modified
such that the number of Commissioners will be less than the number of
Member States. The Council, based on the principle of equality, will adopt a
rotation system. It will also be for the Council to decide on the number of
Commissioners.
The Nice Treaty makes other important changes in relation to the
Commission. Article 214(2) is amended such that the nomination of the
President of the Commission will be by qualified majority, rather than common
accord. The logic of this change is carried over to Article 215, dealing with
replacement of a Commissioner. The powers of the Commission President
have been reinforced through changes to Article 217. The Commission works
under the political guidance of the President, who will decide on its internal
organization in order to ensure that it acts consistently, efficiently, and on the
basis of collegiality. The President was given formal powers to allocate
151. Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 3, 2001, O.J. (C 80) 1 (2001), art. 2, available at http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/nicetreatyen.pdf.
152. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Presidency Note: IGC
2000-Size and Composition of the Commission, CONFER 4813/00, (Dec. 1, 2000), available at http://
db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/4813en.pdf.
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portfolios, and to reshuffle them. The President was also empowered to request
the resignation of a Commissioner, after obtaining the approval of the College.
A provision such as this might have forestalled some of the crisis which led to
the downfall of the Santer Commission.
The discussion of the post-Nice institutional balance so far as it relates to
the Commission would be defective if it did not take into account the reforms
which took place outside the IGC. The crisis following the fall of the Santer
Commission led, as we have seen, to a widespread reevaluation of its internal
structure and operation.' 5 3 The detailed reforms to be implemented after the
White Paper' 5 4 will affect not only the internal order of the Commission itself,
but will also have ramifications for the way in which it interacts with the other
major Community institutions.
The Nice Treaty made other changes which could have an impact on the
overall nature of decisionmaking. The provisions on flexibility were altered so
as to render it easier for them to be used in an expanded Union. Whether they
are used remains to be seen.
It is common for IGCs to leave much on the "cutting room floor."
Proposals are put forward, and may well be taken to an advanced stage, only to
be dropped because of failure to secure the requisite support needed for
inclusion in the final Treaty amendment. The most significant such casualty
that would have affected the Community's institutional balance was concerned
with the legislative process itself. There were suggestions to include some
element of a hierarchy of norms within the Treaty. 55 The main aspect of this
was to be amendment to Article 251, the codecision procedure. The idea was
that measures enacted under this procedure would define the general principles,
the objectives to be attained, and the essential elements of the measures to be
taken. Matters of detailed implementation would then be enacted under other
processes, requiring less input from the European Parliament. Suggestions
along these lines survived into the autumn of 2000,156 but did not find their way
into the Nice Treaty itself.

153. Craig, supra note 142.
154. Reforming the Commission, supra note 145.
155. E.g., Presidency Note, supra note 146; Legal Adviser, SN 3068/00, May 30 2000.
156. Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Progress Report on the
Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Reform, CONFER 4790/00,-Nov. 3, 2000, available at
http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/4790en.pdf.
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It is also common for IGCs to leave for future deliberation matters on
which consensus could not be reached within the available time. This was the
57
case in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The Charter was drafted by a body, called the Convention, which operated
independently of the IGC. The Charter was approved by the European Council
at Nice, but the crucial question as to its precise legal status was put aside until
2004.
VI. INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: LAEKEN AND BEYOND

The Laeken European Council' 5 8 laid the institutional foundations for the
next round of Treaty reform. It established a Convention, headed by Giscard
d'Estaing, with two Vice Chairmen, a representative from each state, two
national members of Parliament from each country, sixteen MEPs, and two
Commission representatives. The accession candidate countries were fully
involved in the Convention proceedings.
The Convention began its
deliberations in March 2002, with the object of completing them within one
year. The Convention will consider the division of competence between the
EU and Member States, simplification of the Union Treaties, the status to be
given to the Charter of Rights, the possibility of a European Constitution, and
moves to enhance democracy, efficiency and transparency in the EU. Each of
these areas was given a broad reading in the Laeken Declaration. We shall
therefore have to await the outcome of the Convention to determine the
conclusions reached on these topics, being mindful that the final Convention
document will be the starting point for discussion in the IGC, which will make
the ultimate decisions.

157. 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/c_364/
c_36420001218en00010022.pdf.
158. Dec. 14-15 2001.

